PDEA SLAMS POLLUTED SOURCE OF STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, CITES MODEST GAINS IN THE FACE OF ADVERSITIES AND LIMITATIONS

 

            The Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency lamented the inaccurate portrayal of the Agency based on the recent report by the United States’ State Department, citing that the Philippine drug problem is “significant “.

 

            PDEA Director General/Senior Undersecretary DIONISIO R, SANTIAGO said that the State Department’s source was “disgruntled and polluted”. It failed to establish the time frame of the problems attributed to the Agency that were enumerated in the report. He admitted that PDEA was ridden with numerous inadequacies upon his assumption into office on April 2006. Foremost of these were the absence of an approved plantilla from the Department of Budget and Management, which is the basis for hiring organic personnel and the allocation of the Agency’s budget.

 

            The PDEA Chief mentioned the dismal state of affairs preceding his administration, where PDEA failed to acquire its own organic firearms, communications equipment and other vital resources needed to meet its mandate as the country’s premier anti-drug organization. It was apparent that PDEA’s organizational growth and development was stunted and set aside for 4 years since its inception. “The real PDEA only started in July 2007 with only 105 organic officers and personnel after the return of two-thirds of its seconded manpower, (deemed as borrowed law enforcement experts). Prior to this, we were constrained to implement a painful cleansing process, where some detailed officers and personnel were arrested and charged for their involvement in illegal drug activities; to include the theft of 7 kilograms of shabu on November 2006”.

 

            Director General Santiago also clarified that the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) World Drug Report indicating the Philippines having the highest methamphetamine prevalence (6 percent) is quite inaccurate since not all countries religiously submit their reports to the UNODC in this regard. As to the alleged “underreporting of the drug problem by Philippine authorities”, the PDEA Chief said that continuing studies are being undertaken to analyze the cause of the increase in the price per gram of shabu; whether it is more the result of sustained supply reduction initiatives or a steadily increasing demand for shabu.

 

            According to the PDEA Chief, “Indeed PDEA is a relatively infant agency. The absence of a regular budget and an approved plantilla during its first 4 years greatly hampered its organizational growth and development. This set-up was inimical and counter-productive to PDEA’s mandate as the country’s lead anti-drug agency. The presence of military officers and personnel on detailed service with PDEA is necessary because they are helping us get through our vital phase of transition”.

 

One military officer in particular, Major Roy Anthony O Derilo, the Acting Director of the PDEA Plans and Operations Service, did most of the labor in preventing the Agency’s projected collapse by end of the given 5 year transition period in 2007. A graduate of the Asian Institute of Management in Makati, the active military major upon guidance of the Director General, studied, planned-out and built the organic capability of the Agency in two (2) years time. The master plan did not only build the initial organic capability of the organization, the plan or approach even created the Agency to what it is now, a professional, credible, and well-respected Government Agency being modeled due its courage and integrity - something that never really happened in four (4) years or took off since it was created in 2002.  

 

            The absence of a regular budget to cover the Agency’s immediate needs compelled Director General Santiago to source out funds from other means to support the Agency’s organizational growth in light of the impending capability and manpower crisis at the end of the 5-year transition period in 2007. The stringent recruitment, selection and training of 600 Drug Enforcement Officers was among the projects funded by the PAGC. Other major projects include the Information Systems Enhancement Program (ISEP); Project Court Watch; Operation: Private Eye, which provides rewards for informants; Evidence Safety and Disposal System (ESDS) all funded by the PAGC. The ESDS is the Agency’s answer to the issue on proper handling, documentation and disposal of drug and non-drug evidence. The Operational Support Rationalization Program (OSRP) is another project which PDEA is currently working to provide funding through non-traditional means.

 

In 2006, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) set the PDEA personnel plantilla and staffing pattern to a very lean 1,850 officers and personnel. More or less 900 of these were actual Drug Enforcement Officers/PDEA Agents items. The State Department report cited, “The PDEA, with its roughly 250 agents and 200 more in training, nearly all of whom began law enforcement careers in the past two years, can have only limited impact in a country of nearly 90 million people.” In reaction to this, Director General Santiago said, “Counter-drug operations are primarily intelligence-based. While we could surely use some additional personnel, especially investigators and intelligence analysts, we do not intend to have too many personnel. The humble gains posted by the still transitioning PDEA are due to the principles of target rationalization and focus on intelligence-based projects, which put emphasis on high value targets. Despite the fact that we were down to only about 105 officers and personnel after the end of the transition period in July 2007, our operations, whether independently or in cooperation with counterparts, resulted in the dismantling of 11 clandestine laboratories and 9 chemical warehouses in 2007 while in 2008, we dismantled 10 clandestine laboratories and 4 chemical warehouses. These figures duplicated the peak years of clandestine laboratory dismantling (2003 and 2004)”.

 

The complete improvement and renovation of the PDEA Academy was another major project supported by the anti-graft fund. While the report also criticized the training system of the PDEA Academy, the Director General found it ironic that the very people who were directly involved with the training and the construction of the initial facilities were criticizing their own handiwork. The PDEA Chief emphasized, “The initial facilities that were constructed at PDEA Academy through the Joint Inter-Agency Task Force West proved to be inadequate to suit the needs of the Drug Enforcement Officers whom we recruited through the anti-graft fund. This necessitated the total renovation of the PDEA Academy so that the facility can accommodate 200 Drug Enforcement Officer (DEO) cadets for every batch. So the report was once again inaccurate when it blatantly alleged that our facilities cannot accommodate 200 cadets”.

 

            As to the absorption of former military officers, dubbed by the report as “mutineers”, the PDEA Chief clarified that they were honorably discharged from the military service and went through proper training and re-orientation at the PDEA Academy. They all took and passed the Career Service Professional Examinations, which makes them eligible for appointment as Drug Enforcement Officers in a purely civilian capacity. They are currently designated as either Intelligence or Operations Officers in the different PDEA Regional Offices and in the operating units at the PDEA National Headquarters. Director General Santiago added, “We appreciate the various training opportunities being provided by foreign counterparts. However, there are set systems and procedures to be followed by all counterparts in coordinating their efforts in the spirit of mutual respect and protocol. The discretion of selecting officers and personnel who will attend overseas training opportunities is vested in the PDEA Foreign Schooling Board. Counterparts cannot directly hand-pick or dictate those who will be trained”.

 

             According to data obtained from the PDEA Legal and Prosecution Service, the sorry state of affairs involving the dismissal of cases filed at the Department of Justice (DOJ) “for lack of evidence and investigatory discipline” can be attributed more to the so-called “experienced law enforcement experts”; contrary to the report which mentioned that cases field by PDEA units being supervised by military officers usually end up being dismissed at the prosecution level. The PDEA Chief said, “The Zamboanga clandestine laboratory case, for instance, was not a PDEA-initiated case; rather, it was filed by police counterparts. It is part of our mandate to monitor all drug cases, without distinction as to which law enforcement unit filed the case”. Records would show that most causes of Acquittal are due to irregularity/ illegality of arrest, search and seizure. This constitutes 29% of the total acquitted drug cases.  Of these 29%, none were caused by new PDEA Agents or those few which are military-led. They were all caused by police enforcers, mostly local police and a few by police enforcers detailed with PDEA then. Likewise the most causes of dismissal of drug cases is due to non-appearance of prosecution witnesses. This constitutes 50%. Of this 50 %, 98% were non-appearance of law enforcement witnesses of local and detailed police enforcers and not by the new drug enforcement agents of PDEA and those that were military-led. The 2% that was dismissed due to non-appearance of prosecution witnesses was caused by five (5) new agents who were charged by PDEA itself for extortion along with their detailed police team leaders.

 

“They cannot controvert the statistics. Not even us in PDEA. In fairness to the majority of police enforcers who are serious and honest in their efforts, there are just some who insist not to do the right way. Fortunately, this is already being addressed by the PNP leadership. This is the very reason why we were constrained to return the so-called law enforcement experts and opted to settle for a few yet professional and dedicated men and women. Our Legal and Prosecution Service has always been hard at work on all drug cases filed by both PDEA and counterpart law enforcement agencies. Each PDEA Regional Office likewise has legal officers and retainers to ensure expeditious legal action and support in all drug cases”, according to the PDEA Chief.

 

            The report likewise mentioned, “A lack of administrative oversight and inadequate fiscal controls promote inefficiency and corruption within the agency. Unit directors have unaudited discretion over operational funds disbursed from headquarters, and corruption sometimes prevents funds from reaching field agents, who often have to use personal funds to undertake drug sting operations. In turn, some agents may seek to recoup their spent personal funds through irregular means”. The PDEA Chief said that this portrayal was more of the exception rather than the rule as far as PDEA operating units are concerned. “Such incidences are the very reasons why we removed and returned some of the perceived law enforcement experts and replaced them with dedicated, qualified and able officers who will ably manage their respective units. They maybe experts in their respective fields, but we need managers, not just experts. This is the same reason why we were constrained to remove some experts, like the former Director of the PDEA Laboratory, who was recommended by American counterparts and a ranking police officer formerly on detail with PDEA and resigned in December 2008.”, he added. In fact, a cursory survey of the different officers designated as PDEA Regional Directors will reveal that only 4 out of the 17 designated Regional Directors were not from the original group of detailed police officers; the other 13 have been with PDEA since its inception or even date back to its predecessor agencies.

 

            In summary, Director General Santiago said that the US State Department report was obviously based on the “After Tour of Duty Report” written by a foreign counterpart who refused to follow basic protocol and policies. “This counterpart wanted to direct PDEA Regional Directors and Service Directors. He wanted to gain control over PDEA, which we did not allow. In fact, I was constrained to request the US Ambassador to replace him. Whatever his motives maybe for writing such unsavory and inaccurate portrayals of PDEA, it is clear that this is part of continuing moves to discredit our Agency.” added the PDEA Chief.